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Abstract
One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models.
First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided
assignment problems, the payos of a matching can be divided between the agents. We take a
similar approach to one-sided assignment problems as Sasaki (1995) for two-sided assignment
problems and we analyze various desirable properties of solutions including consistency and weak
pairwise-monotonicity. We show that for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems
(i.e., the subset of one-sided assignment problems with a non-empty core), if a subsolution
of the core satises [indierence with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and consistency]
or [Pareto indierence and consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2).
However, we also prove that on the class of all one-sided assignment problems (solvable or not),
no solution satises consistency and coincides with the core whenever the core is non-empty
(Theorem 3). Finally, we comment on the diculty in obtaining further positive results for the
class of solvable one-sided assignment problems in line with Sasaki's (1995) characterizations of
the core for two-sided assignment problems.
JEL classication: C71, C78, D63.
Keywords: (One-sided) assignment problems, consistency, core, matching.
1 Introduction
Most racket sports (tennis, squash, badminton, etc.) have established top level doubles competi-
tions. At the start of each season there is a predened time frame in which players have to organize
themselves into pairs. Once pairs are formed, partners cannot be changed during the season. If
a player fails to form a pair she cannot participate in the doubles competition. The players, with
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1very few exceptions, are professionals who are driven by their passion for the sport but also by
pecuniary interests. The latter plays an important role as the prizes at stake in the tournaments
throughout the year represent the players most signicant source of revenue. This situation leads
to a problem, where (rational) players have to simultaneously decide upon how to form pairs and
how to distribute payos. Since reshuing of the pairs throughout the seasons is minor, we assume
that there are many instances where the problem faced by the players has a stable solution. But
what properties would this solution to the problem satisfy? What would happen to the solution if
some pairs dropped out of the competition with their gains? Considering that the changes in the
doubles hierarchy are relatively small from one season to another, players estimations with respect
to the potential gains of each pair in the competition are likely to be adjusted from one season to
another by small amounts. Does the adjustment aect the solution? Finally, would the solution be
aected if one focuses on pecuniary driven players who are indierent with respect to the identity
of their partners as long as their revenue is kept invariant? We call the situation described in this
example a one-sided assignment problem and we call the properties of the solutions described above
consistency, continuity, respectively Pareto indierence.
A one-sided assignment problem has many similarities with two well known models in matching:
roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and assignment problems (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).
In roommate problems, agents have preferences over other agents and being alone (or consuming
an outside option) and any two agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. If the value
a single agent creates can be consumed by herself and if the value a pair of agents creates is divided
between them according to a xed division, then a roommate problem as described above is the
result. With a one-sided assignment problem we model a roommate problem where the assumption
that the payos to agents are xed ex-ante is relaxed. In two-sided assignment problems, the set of
agents is partitioned into two sets and only agents from dierent sets can be paired. Then, based
on how agents are matched in such a two-sided market, the division of payos to agents is exible
as part of the solution.
Here, we generalize both models by allowing for one-sided matching as in roommate problems
and for exible division of payos as in two-sided assignment problems. Eriksson and Karlander
(2001) and Sotomayor (2005) modeled and analyzed one-sided assignment problems. A one-sided
assignment problem consists of a set of agents and a value function that species the worth of
trade gain or the payo of working together for each pair of agents. A feasible outcome for a
one-sided assignment problem is a matching that partitions the set of agents in pairs and singletons
and a payo vector that divides the total value of the matching between the agents. A solution
assigns to any one-sided assignment problem a non-empty subset of feasible outcomes. As in many
other economies, a concept of special interest is the core. Eriksson and Karlander (2001) give a
characterization of the core by a forbidden minors criterion while Sotomayor (2005) shows that
there are one-sided assignment problems with an empty core and identies necessary and sucient
2conditions for the non-emptiness of the core. Hence, strictly speaking, the core is not a solution
for the class of all one-sided assignment problems.
We call a one-sided assignment problem with a non-empty core solvable. First, with Exam-
ple 2, we show that a solvable one-sided assignment problem is not essentially equal to a two-sided
assignment problem, that is, a solvable one-sided assignment problem cannot always be mapped
onto a core-isomorphic two-sided assignment problem. Then, we aim to extend insights from the
normative analysis of two-sided assignment problems to solvable one-sided assignment problems.
For two-sided assignment problems, there are several characterizations of the core using con-
sistency as a central property. Consistency is an invariance requirement of the solutions if some
couples and singles decide to leave with their payos. To understand this property, suppose that
after agents are matched and payos are divided according to the solution, some of the agents
decide to leave with their payos and with their match, and the remaining agents decide to apply
the same solution to the restricted one-sided assignment problem. A solution would be considered
to be \inconsistent" if it solves such a restricted one-sided assignment problem dierently than
before. For a comprehensive survey on consistency, see Thomson (2009).
In the rst characterization, Sasaki (1995, Theorem 2) considers consistency in conjunction
with individual rationality, couple rationality, Pareto optimality, continuity, and weak pairwise-
monotonicity. In the second characterization, Sasaki (1995, Theorem 4) replaces continuity by
Pareto indierence. Sasaki (1995) proves both characterizations by showing that (Step 1) the core
satises all properties used in both characterizations, (Step 2) a solution that satises all properties
as stated in each of the characterizations is a subsolution of the core, and (Step 3) a solution that is
a subsolution of the core and satises all properties as stated in each of the characterizations equals
the core. For a two-sided assignment problem closely related to the one investigated by Sasaki
(1995), Toda (2005) also obtains two characterizations of the core (see Toda, 2005, Theorems 3.1
and 3.2, and the discussion of how his results relate to Sasaki's results on page 249).
We adopt the same properties as considered by Sasaki (1995) to see in how far his results for
two-sided assignment problems can be extended to one-sided assignment problems. Since Sasaki
(1995) characterized the core, we start by restricting attention to the class of solvable one-sided
assignment problems. First, and corresponding to Step 1 of Sasaki's analysis, we prove that on the
class of solvable one-sided assignment problems, the core satises all properties as considered by
Sasaki (1995) (Proposition 1). Second, and corresponding to Step 3 of Sasaki's analysis, we show
that for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems, if a subsolution of the core satises
[indierence with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and consistency] or [Pareto indierence
and consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2). Note that indierence with
respect to dummy agents is a new property that we introduce, and that without this property
neither our Theorem 1 nor Sasaki's corresponding Theorem 1 would be correct (see Remark 3 and
the counterexample therein). Adapting Sasaki's Step 2 directly to solvable one-sided assignment
3problems turns out to be impossible because certain steps in the proof would transform a solvable
one-sided assignment problem into one with an empty core. We discuss this issue with Step 2 for
solvable one-sided assignment problems in Subsection 4.2 in more detail. It is currently an open
problem if Sasaki's (1995, Theorems 2 and 4) characterizations of the core can be extended to the
class of solvable one-sided assignment problems. Finally, we prove that on the class of all one-sided
assignment problems (solvable or not), no solution satises consistency and coincides with the core
whenever the core is non-empty (Theorem 3).
2 Model and Denitions
We rst introduce the one-sided version of Shapley and Shubik's (1972) well-known (two-sided)
assignment problems. Our model extends Sasaki (1995) and it coincides with the roommate model
with transferable utility introduced by Eriksson and Karlander (2001) and with the one-sided
assignment model introduced by Sotomayor (2005).
Let N be the set of potential agents and N be the set of all non-empty nite subsets of N, i.e.,
N = fN  N j 1 > jNj > 0g. For any N 2 N we denote the set of distinct pairs that agents in
N can form (including the degenerate case where only one agent i 2 N forms a \pair" (i;i)) by
P(N) = f(i;j) 2 N  N j i  jg. For any N 2 N a function  : P(N) ! R+ such that for each
i 2 N, (i;i) = 0, is a characteristic function for N. For each pair (i;j) 2 P(N), (i;j)  0 is
the monetary benet or value that i and j can jointly obtain; in particular, (i;i) = 0 denotes the
(xed) reservation value of agent i. Let (N) be the set of all characteristic functions on P(N).
A one-sided assignment problem  is a pair (N;) 2 N (N). A two-sided assignment problem
is a one-sided assignment problem where the set of agents N can be partitioned in two subsets M
and W, i.e., N = M [ W and M \ W = ;, and all coalitions from the same side of the market fail
to generate additional value, i.e., for each (i;j) 2 M  M and (i;j) 2 W  W, (i;j) = 0. We
denote the set of all one-sided (two-sided) assignment problems for N 2 N by  N (~  N) and the
set of all one-sided (two-sided) assignment problems by   = [N2N N (~   = [N2N ~  N).
A matching  for  2  N is a function  : N ! N of order two, i.e., for each i 2 N, ((i)) = i.
Two agents i;j 2 N are matched if (i) = j (or equivalently (j) = i); for notational convenience
we also use the notation (i;j) 2 . If i 6= j, then we say that agents i and j are paired and they
form a couple. If i = j, we say that agent i is paired to herself and she remains single. Thus, at
any matching  the set of agents is partitioned into a set of couples C() = f(i;j) 2 P(N) j (i) =
j;i 6= jg and a set of singles S() = fi 2 N j (i) = ig, with jNj = 2jC()j + jS()j. For N 2 N,
let M(N) denote the set of matchings.
A matching that generates maximal value is (socially) optimal. That is, for  2  N, a matching
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OM() denote the set of optimal matchings. Note that for any  2  N, OM() 6= ;.
4For  2  N, a feasible outcome is a pair (;u) where  2 M(N) is a matching and u 2 RjNj
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(i;j)20 (i;j). That is, for  2  N a feasible outcome (;u) is Pareto optimal,
if  2 OM(). For  2  N, let PO() denote the set of Pareto optimal outcomes.
Individual rationality is a voluntary participation condition based on the idea that agents cannot
be forced to enter in agreements that yield negative payos. For  2  N, a feasible outcome (;u) is
individually rational if for each i 2 N, ui  0. For  2  N, let IR() denote the set of individually
rational outcomes.
Couple rationality ensures that paired agents receive a payo greater or equal to their own value.
For  2  N, a feasible outcome (;u) is couple rational if for each (i;j) 2 C(), ui + uj  (i;j).
Note that the non-negativity of values and feasibility imply that if (;u) 2 F() is couple rational,
then for each (i;j) 2 C(), ui + uj = (i;j) and for each i 2 S(), ui = (i;i). For  2  N, let
CR() denote the set of couple rational outcomes.1
Let  2  N and (;u) 2 F(). If there are two agents (i;j) 2 P(N) such that i 6= j and
ui+uj < (i;j), then i and j have an incentive to form a couple in order to obtain a higher payo.
In this case, fi;jg is a blocking pair for the outcome (;u).
For  2  N, a feasible outcome (;u) is stable if it is individually rational and no blocking pairs
exist, i.e., (;u) 2 IR() and for each (i;j) 2 P(N) such that i 6= j, ui +uj  (i;j). For  2  N,
let S() denote the set of stable outcomes. Let  2  N be solvable if S() 6= ;. The following
example shows that the set of stable outcomes may be empty.
Example 1. A one-sided assignment problem that is not solvable.
Let N = f1;2;3g,  such that (1;2) = (2;3) = (1;3) = 1, and  = (N;). Then, for
each (;u) 2 F(), u1 + u2 + u3  1 and there exist two agents i and j, i 6= j, such that
ui + uj < (i;j) = 1. Thus, S() = ;. 
Remark 1. On the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems, the set of stable outcomes
coincides with the core (Sotomayor, 2005, Proposition 1), i.e., for each  2  , S() = C(), where
C() denotes the core for problem .2 
Since for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems the set of stable outcomes and the
core coincide, from now on we will use the two notions interchangeably.
1Our denition of couple rationality is identical to the one in Sasaki (1995) and it implies (pairwise) feasibility in
Toda (2005) and Sotomayor (2005).
2Alternatively, we could model a one-sided assignment problem  2  
N as the following cooperative game with
transferable utility (TU). Let  be the associated TU characteristic function that assigns to each coalition S, (S) 
max2M(S)f
P
(i;j)2 (i;j)g with (;) = 0. The core of  2  
N equals C() = f(;u) 2 F() j for all S 
N;
P
i2S ui  (S)g: Thus, a feasible outcome is in the core if no coalition of agents S  N can improve their payos
by rematching among themselves.
5Investigating the precise conditions which guarantee the solvability of a one-sided assignment
problem and a full comparison of solvable one-sided assignment problems to two-sided assignment
problems is beyond the purpose of this paper. However, we note that Eriksson and Karlander
(2001) nd that there are many similarities between solvable one-sided assignment problems and
two-sided assignment problems. The impression one might get is that in the core of solvable one-
sided assignment problems there always exists a \two-sided" partition of the agents. Then, it could
be possible that for each solvable one-sided assignment problem there exists a core-isomorphic
two-sided assignment problem, i.e., by choosing the appropriate partition of agents (setting the
values of now incompatible pairs equal to zero) one can convert the one-sided assignment problem
into a two-sided assignment problem without changing the set of core outcomes. The following
example shows that a solvable one-sided assignment problem cannot always be mapped onto a
core-isomorphic two-sided assignment problem.
Example 2. Two-sided and solvable one-sided problems are not core-isomorphic.
Let N = f1;2;3g,  such that (1;2) = 2, (2;3) = (1;3) = 1, and  = (N;). Then,  is solvable
because S() = f(;u) j  = (2;1;3) and u = (1;1;0)g. The unique stable matching  induces a
natural partition of the set of agents N = M [ W where agents 1 and 2 have dierent genders.
Assume that this solvable one-sided assignment problem can be mapped onto a core-isomorphic two-
sided assignment problem and, without loss of generality, M = f1;3g and W = f2g. Then, formally
we can associate with  a two-sided assignment problem 0  (M [ W;0), where we dene 0 as
the restriction of  to feasible (man-woman) pairs, i.e., 0(1;2) = 2, 0(2;3) = 1, and in dierence
to , 0(1;3) = 0 (agents 1 and 3 are both male and now do not create any positive surplus). The
problem 0 is still solvable since S(0) = f(;u0) j  = (2;1;3) and u0 = (;2 ;0) for  2 [0;1]g.
Observe that u0
1  u1, u0
2  u2, and u0
3 = u3, and that the same matching  is part of both S()
and S(0). Thus, S()   S(0). Therefore, 0 has additional stable outcomes and it is not, as
suspected, core-isomorphic to . 
A solution species how to form couples and how to distribute payos among the agents.
Formally, a solution ' is a correspondence that associates with each  2   a non-empty subset of
feasible outcomes, i.e., for each  2  , '()  F() and '() 6= ;. A solution '0 is a subsolution of
solution ' if for each  2  , '0()  '().
3 Properties of Solutions
In this section we introduce desirable properties of solutions.
Denition 1. Individual rationality
For each  2  , '()  IR().
6Denition 2. Couple rationality
For each  2  , '()  CR().
Denition 3. Pareto optimality
For each  2  , '()  PO().
Pareto indierence requires that if an outcome is chosen by the solution, then all feasible
outcomes containing the same payo vector have to be part of the solution.
Denition 4. Pareto indierence
For each  2   and each (;u) 2 '(), if (0;u) 2 F(), then (0;u) 2 '().
For our next property we introduce the notion of dummy agents: agents who when paired at
a given matching do not create any positive surplus. For  2  N,  2 M(N), i and j are dummy
agents for  if (i;j) = 0 and (i;j) 2 C(). For  2  N,  2 M(N), let DA(;) denote the set
of dummy agents for .
Indierence with respect to dummy agents requires that if an outcome for which the match-
ing pairs some dummy agents is chosen by the solution, then all feasible outcomes obtained by
\unmatching" some of the dummy agents have to be part of the solution.
Denition 5. Indierence with respect to dummy agents
For each  2  , each (;u) 2 '(), and all (0;u) 2 F() such that C(0)  C() and S(0)nS() =
DA(;), (0;u) 2 '().3
Note that indierence with respect to dummy agents has no bite if DA(;) = ;. Furthermore,
Pareto indierence implies indierence with respect to dummy agents.
Continuity, loosely speaking requires that small changes in the value function induce small
changes in solution outcomes.
Denition 6. Continuity
For each N 2 N, for any natural number k, and each ;k 2  , where  = (N;) and k = (N;k)
such that (;uk) 2 '(N;k), if for each (i;j) 2 P(N), k(i;j)       !
k!1
(i;j) and for each i 2 N,
uk
i       !
k!1
ui, then (;u) 2 '(N;).
To dene the next property we rst introduce the notion of a subproblem. Let  = (N;),
N0  N, and P(N0) = f(i;j) 2 N0N0 j i  jg. We denote by jN0 the restriction of value function
 to P(N0), i.e., jN0 : P(N0) ! R
jN0j
+ such that for each (i;j) 2 P(N0), jN0(i;j) = (i;j). Then,
jN0 = (N0;jN0) 2  N0
is a subproblem of .
Let N 2 N and N0  N. For any matching  2 M(N), we denote by (N0) the set of agents
that are matched to agents in N0, i.e., (N0) = fi 2 N j  1(i) 2 N0g. Furthermore, for any
3Note that C(
0)  C() implies S(
0)  S().
7u 2 RjNj, let ujN0 denote the restriction of vector u to N0, i.e., ujN0  u0 2 RjN0j such that for each
i 2 N0, u0
i = ui.
Consistency is an invariance requirement of the solutions if some couples and singles decide to
leave with their payos. For a comprehensive survey on consistency, see Thomson (2009).
Denition 7. Consistency
For each N 2 N, each  2  N, each (;u) 2 '(), and each N0  N such that (N0) = N0,
(jN0;ujN0) 2 '(jN0).
Weak pairwise-monotonicity requires that if the value of a couple is increased, then the total
payo of the couple should not decrease.
Denition 8. Weak pairwise-monotonicity
For each  2  , where  = (N;), each (i;j) 2 P(N), i 6= j, and all  = (N;) such that
(i;j)  (i;j) and (1)
(i0;j0) = (i0;j0); otherwise, (2)
if (;u) 2 '(), then there exists (;u) 2 '() such that u
i + u
j  ui + uj.
4 Results
4.1 Positive results on the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems
Our rst positive result shows that the core of solvable one-sided assignment problems satises all
of the above properties, which extends a similar result by Sasaki (1995, Propositions 3 and 4) for
two-sided assignment problems to solvable one-sided assignment problems.4
Proposition 1. On the class of solvable problems, the core satises individual rationality, cou-
ple rationality, Pareto optimality, Pareto indierence, indierence with respect to dummy agents,
continuity, consistency, and weak pairwise-monotonicity.
Proof.
Individual rationality, couple rationality, and Pareto optimality: For each solvable  2  , if (;u) 2
S(), then it is immediate that (;u) 2 PO() \ IR() \ CR().
Pareto indierence and indierence with respect to dummy agents: For each solvable  2  , assume
(;u) 2 S(). Let (0;u) 2 F(). Then, since any blocking pair for (0;u) would also be a blocking
pair for (;u), (0;u) 2 S(). Furthermore, Pareto indierence implies indierence with respect to
dummy agents.
4It is also easy to show that the core of solvable one-sided assignment problems satises converse consistency.
However, since we do not use converse consistency in the sequel, we do not include it in this paper.
8Continuity: Let ;k 2   be solvable, (;uk) 2 S(k) as in the denition of continuity, and
uk
i       !
k!1
ui, k(i;j)       !
k!1
(i;j). Since the correspondence of feasible outcomes is continuous,
(;u) is feasible. By stability, for each i 2 N, uk
i  0 and for each (i;j) 2 P(N), uk
i +uk
j  k(i;j).
Letting k ! 1, for each i 2 N, ui  0 and for each (i;j) 2 P(N), ui + uj  (i;j). Hence,
(;u) 2 S().
Consistency: For each solvable  2  , if (;u) 2 S(), then there do not exist any blocking pairs
for (;u). Hence, no blocking pairs exist in any of the (smaller) reduced problems and all reduced
problems are solvable.
Weak pairwise-monotonicity: Let ; 2   be solvable and (i;j) 2 P(N) as in the denition of
weak pairwise-monotonicity. We show that (;u) 2 S() implies that there exists (;u) 2 S()
such that u
i + u
j  ui + uj.
Let (;u) 2 S(). Then,  2 OM() and for each (i0;j0) 2 P(N);i0 6= j0;ui0 + uj0  (i0;j0).
Case 1: Assume (i) = j.
Let  =  and dene u as follows: u
i = ui + [(i;j)   (i;j)]=2, u
j = uj + [(i;j)   (i;j)]=2
and for each i0 2 N n fi;jg; u
i0 = ui0. By (1), (i;j)  (i;j) and consequently u
i, u
j  0. Thus,
(;u) 2 IR(). Since (i;j) 2 C(), u
i + u
j = (i;j). By denition of u, for each (i0;j0) 6=
(i;j), u
i0 + u
j0 = ui0 + uj0. Since (;u) 2 S(), ui0 + uj0  (i0;j0) and by (2), (i0;j0) = (i0;j0).
Thus, for each (i0;j0) 2 P(N) such that i0 6= j0 we have u
i0 + u
j0  (i0;j0), i.e., (;u) 2 S().
Note that u
i + u
j = ui + uj + [(i;j)   (i;j)] which by (1) yields u
i + u
j  ui + uj.
Case 2: Assume (i) 6= j.













Case 2.1: Assume (i) = j.




















there exists (i00;j00) 6= (i;j) such that (i00;j00) 2 C() and (i00;j00) > ui00 + uj00. But by (2),
(i00;j00) = (i00;j00). Hence, (i00;j00) > ui00 + uj00, which is a contradiction to (;u) 2 S().
Therefore, u
i + u
j  ui + uj.
Case 2.2: Assume (i) 6= j.








(i;j)2 (i;j), which is a contradiction to
 2 OM(). Alternatively, now assume  2 OM(). Then, we could have chosen u = u, which
gives u
i + u
j = ui + uj.
9Remark 2. The class of solvable one-sided assignment problems is closed
An immediate consequence of the continuity of the core (Proposition 1) is that the class of solvable
one-sided assignment problems is closed, i.e., if for all k 2 N, k 2  N is solvable and k       !
k!1
 2
 N, then  is also solvable.
We next prove that if a consistent subsolution of the core satises indierence with respect to
dummy agents and continuity, then it coincides with the core. Note that Sasaki (1995, Theorem 1)
states this result without using indierence with respect to dummy agents for two-sided assignment
problems. We show in Remark 3 that adding indierence with respect to dummy agents is indeed
necessary (also for two-sided assignment problems).
Theorem 1. On the class of solvable problems, if ' is a subsolution of the core satisfying in-
dierence with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and consistency, then ' coincides with the
core.
Proof. Let  2  N be a solvable problem. Then, since ' is a subsolution of the core, '()  S().
We prove that '()  S(), i.e., we show that (;u) 2 S() implies (;u) 2 '().
Step 1: Intuitively, we start from  and a stable outcome (with a maximal number of dummy agents)
by adding a new agent n. By construction, we preserve the original set of optimal matchings and
we extend each optimal matching with the single new agent n. Further, we require that any paired
agent can maintain the same utility as the one obtained within her current partnership when pairing
with n.
Formally, let (;u) 2 S(). We will not work with matching  directly, but with a matching
DA (possibly DA = ) that has a maximal number of dummy agents such that the only possible
dierence between DA and  is that some dummy agents for DA are single at matching , i.e.,
C(DA)  C() and S() n S(DA) = DA(;DA) and there exists no matching ^  such that
C(^ )  C(), S()nS(^ ) = DA(; ^ ), and jDA(; ^ )j > jDA(;DA)j. Note that (DA;u) 2 S()
and that at DA at most one agent is single: if more than one agent is single, then the matching DA
is not optimal (two single agents have a positive value) or it does not match the maximal number
of dummy agents (two single agents have value 0). In the remainder of the proof we distinguish
the two Cases (a) S(DA) = fdg and (b) S(DA) = ;.
Let n 2 N n N and N = N [ fng. For Case (a) we dene  such that for each i 2 N n fdg,
(i) = DA(i), (d) = d, and (n) = n and   such that for each i 2 N n fdg,  (i) = DA(i)
and  (d) = n. For Case (b) we dene  such that for each i 2 N, (i) = DA(i) and (n) = n.
Hence, (a) S() = fd;ng and S( ) = ; and (b) S() = fng.
For each i 2 N, let (i;n) = ui = u
i and for each (i;j) 2 P(N), (i;j) = (i;j). Let
 = (N;). Because the entrant n does not create any new blocking pairs, it follows that (a)
(;u);( ;u) 2 S() and (b) (;u) 2 S(). Note that (a) DA(;) = ; and DA(;  ) =
fd;ng and (b) DA(;) = ;.
10Step 2: Next, starting from  we construct " as follows: ceteris paribus, we increase the value
of all couples at  that do not include agent n by " and we symmetrically distribute the benets
within these couples.







2], "(d;n) = (d;n), and u"
d = u"
n = 0. For each (i;j) 2 P(N) n C(DA), "(i;j) = (i;j).








n = 0. For each (i;j) 2 P(N) n C(), "(i;j) = (i;j).
Let " = (N;"). Because the change in couples' values does not create any new blocking
pairs, it follows that (a) (;u");( ;u") 2 S(") and (b) (;u") 2 S("). Hence, (a) f;  g 
OM(") and (b) fg  OM("). Note that (a) DA(";) = ; and DA(";  ) = fd;ng and
(b) DA(";) = ;.
Claim 1: (a) OM(") = f;  g and (b) OM(") = fg.
Let 0 2 M(N) with (a) 0 6= ;   or (b) 0 6= . Since for (a) and (b) (;u) 2 S(),








(i;j)20 (i;j) + jC(DA) \ C(0)j ": (5)
Observe that
jC(DA) \ C(0)j  jC(DA)j: (6)
By construction of DA, (a) jC(DA)j =
jNj 2
2 or (b) jC(DA)j =
jNj 1
2 . Hence, if jC(DA) \
C(0)j = jC(DA)j,6 then C(0) = C(DA) = C() and S(0) = S(). Consequently, 0 = , a




(i;j)20 "(i;j). Hence, (a) OM(") = f;  g and (b) OM(") = fg.
By Claim 1, (a)  and   are and (b)  is the only optimal matching(s) for ". However,
there might be innitely many payo vectors associated with these optimal matching(s) (Sotomayor,
2003, Theorem 1).
Claim 2: Let (; ~ u) 2 S("). Then, for each i 2 N, j~ ui   u"
ij  "
2.
For Case (a) S() = fd;ng, ~ ud = u"
d = 0, and ~ un = u"
n = 0. Hence, j~ ud   u"
dj = j~ un   u"
nj = 0.
For Case (b) S() = fng and ~ un = u"
n = 0. Hence, j~ un   u"
nj = 0. Now consider couples' payos.
Recall that compared to , in " the value of each couple is increased by ". Intuitively, we show
that any payo renegotiations within each pair should be limited to ", as any attempt of a paired
agent to negotiate a payo in excess of " would induce her partner to leave the couple in favor of
a partnership with agent n. Formally, let (i;j) 2 C().
5Note that for Case (a) C(
DA) = C(
) = C( 
) n f(d;n)g.
6Recall that in Case (a) we also assume 
0 6=  
.
11Case 1: ~ ui   u"
i <  "
2
Then ~ ui < u"
i   "
2 = u
i = ui. By construction, for each i 2 N, (i;n) = ui. Thus, (i;n) forms a
blocking pair, and (; ~ u) = 2 S(").
Case 2: ~ ui   u"
i > "
2
Since  2 OM("), for any (i;j) 2 C(), ~ ui + ~ uj = u"
i + u"
j. Then ~ ui   u"
i = u"
j   ~ uj > "
2. Thus,
~ uj   u"
j <  "
2 and similarly as in Case 1, it follows that (; ~ u) = 2 S(").
In Case (a) we in addition have (; ~ u) 2 S(") if and only if ( ; ~ u) 2 S(").
Step 3: By assumption, '(")  S("). Thus, S(") \ '(") 6= ;. For Case (a), assume that
( ;  u) 2 S(")\'("). Then, by indierence with respect to dummy agents, (;  u) 2 S(")\'(").
Hence, for both cases, there exists (;  u) 2 S(")\'("). By Claim 2, for each i 2 N, j ui u"
ij  "
2.
Letting " ! 0, for each i 2 N, j ui   u"
ij ! 0 and u"
i ! u
i. By continuity, (;u) 2 '().
Note that N  N such that (N) = N, 
jN = , and (
jN;u




jN). Thus, (DA;u) 2 '(). Since (;u) 2 F(), by indierence with respect to
dummy agents, (;u) 2 '().
Remark 3. Indierence with respect to dummy agents and Sasaki's (1995) Theorem 1
For Theorem 1 to hold, the requirement that the subsolution of the core ' satises indierence
with respect to dummy agents is necessary.
Proof. For each solvable  2  , dene ~ ' as the subsolution of the core with a maximum number of
matched (dummy) agents. To illustrate the way ~ ' selects from the core, consider the construction
of (DA;u) starting from a stable outcome (;u) in the proof of Theorem 1: if  has fewer matched
agents than DA, then (DA;u) 2 ~ '() and (;u) 62 ~ '(). For N = f1;2g,  such that (1;2) = 0,
and  = (N;) dene  = (2;1) and 0 = (1;2). Then, ~ '() = f(;u)g   f(;u);(0;u)g = S(),
where u = (0;0). It is easy to see that ~ ' is a subsolution of the core that satises continuity and
consistency, but not indierence with respect to dummy agents.
Note that for the two-sided assignment model Sasaki (1995, Theorem 1) states that "If ' is
a subsolution of the core satisfying consistency and continuity, then ' = S." However, solution
~ ' establishes a counterexample to Sasaki's result where only ~ '   S, but not ' = S holds (in
problem  above we can assume that agent 1 is a man and agent 2 is a woman). For two-sided
and solvable one-sided assignment problems where reservation values are not xed but are allowed
to vary (see, for instance, Toda, 2005), our Theorem 1 holds without requiring indierence with
respect to dummy agents.7 Hence, xing reservation values in our one-sided (or in classic two-sided)
assignment model is not without loss of generality. 
The next theorem extends a result by Sasaki (1995, Theorem 3) for two-sided assignment
problems to solvable one-sided assignment problems.
7For completeness, we include the proof of this result in Appendix A.
12Theorem 2. On the class of solvable problems, if ' is a subsolution of the core satisfying consis-
tency and Pareto indierence, then ' coincides with the core.
Proof. Let  2  N be a solvable problem. Then, since ' is a subsolution of the core, '()  S().
We prove that '()  S(), i.e., we show that (;u) 2 S() implies (;u) 2 '().
Let (;u) 2 S(). Let n 2 N n N and N = N [ fng. Let (n) = n and for each i 2 N,
(i) = (i). For each i 2 N, let (i;n) = ui = u
i and for each (i;j) 2 P(N), (i;j) = (i;j).
Let  = (N;). Because the entrant n does not create any new blocking pairs, it follows that
(;u) 2 S() and  2 OM(). From the denition of  and u, observe that every agent
i 2 N can maintain his utility level u
i by matching with the new agent n. Let (~ ; ~ u) 2 S(). It is
well-known that if an agent is single at a stable outcome than at any stable outcome she will get
exactly her reservation value (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Lemma 8.5). Thus, since (n) = n,
u
n = ~ un = 0. Since (~ ; ~ u) 2 S(), for each i 2 N, ~ ui = ~ ui + ~ un  (i;n) = u
i. Note that the
inequality cannot be strict as it would contradict  2 OM(). Thus, we have shown that ~ u = u,
i.e., (~ ;u) 2 S().
By assumption, '()  S(). Thus, S() \ '() 6= ;, i.e., there exists (~ ;u) 2 S() such
that (~ ;u) 2 '(). Since (;u) 2 F(), by Pareto indierence (;u) 2 '(). Note that
N  N such that (N) = N, 
jN = , and (
jN;u




jN). Thus, (;u) 2 '().
4.2 Impossibilities and limitations
Recall that for two-sided assignment problems, the core is always non-empty. However, for one-
sided assignment problems, this need not be the case (see Example 1). The positive results centered
around consistency in the previous subsection were obtained when restricting attention to the class
of solvable one-sided assignment problems. Next, it is natural to ask if it is possible to obtain
consistency and nice \core properties" whenever possible for the entire class of one-sided assignment
problems. The following theorem and corollary shows some impossibilities.
Theorem 3. There exists no solution ' that coincides with the core whenever the core is nonempty
and that satises consistency.
Proof. Let ' be a consistent solution such that for each solvable one-sided assignment problem
 2  , '() = S(). Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g,  such that (1;2) = (2;3) = (3;4) = (4;5) =
(1;5) = 1, for all (i;j) 2 P(N) n f(1;2);(2;3);(3;4);(4;5);(1;5)g, (i;j) = 0, and  = (N;).
Note that for any  2 M(), 2jC()j + jS()j = jNj = 5. One can easily show that S() = ; (the
proof is similar to the arguments used in Example 1).
13Case 1: Let (;u) 2 '() such that [jC()j = 0 and jS()j = 5] or [jC()j = 1 and jS()j = 3].
Hence, there exists fi;jg 2 S() such that j = i+1 (modulo 5). Thus, (i;j) = 1. Let N0 = fi;jg
and consider the subproblem jN0. Then, S(jN0) = f(0;u0) j 0(i) = j and u0 = (;1   ) for  2
[0;1]g and (jN0;ujN0) = 2 S(jN0) (because ui = uj = 0). Since S(jN0) 6= ;, '(jN0) = S(jN0).
Hence, in contradiction to ' being consistent, (jN0;ujN0) = 2 '(jN0).
Case 2: Let (;u) 2 '() such that jC()j = 2 and jS()j = 1.
Without loss of generality, assume C() = f(1;2);(3;4))g and S() = f5g.
Step 1: Let N0 = f1;2;5g and consider the subproblem jN0. Then, S(jN0) = f(0;u0);(~ ;u0) j
0 = (2;1;5); ~  = (5;2;1); and u0 = (1;0;0)g. Since S(jN0) 6= ;, '(jN0) = S(jN0).
If u1 6= 1, then in contradiction to ' being consistent, (jN0;ujN0) = 2 '(jN0). Hence, u1 = 1.
Step 2: Let N00 = f3;4;5g and consider the subproblem jN00. Then, S(jN00) = f(00;u00);( ;u00) j
00 = (4;3;5);   = (3;5;4) and u00 = (0;1;0)g. Since S(jN00) 6= ;, '(jN00) = S(jN00).
If u4 6= 1, then in contradiction to ' being consistent, (jN00;ujN00) = 2 '(jN00). Hence, u4 = 1.
Step 3: Let N = f1;2;3;4g and consider the subproblem jN. Note that S(jN) 6= ; (e.g.,
(jN;(0;1;1;0)) 2 S(jN)). Hence, '(jN) = S(jN).
By consistency, (jN;ujN) 2 '(jN). Recall that jN = (2;1;4;3), (1;2)+(3;4) = 2, and
by Steps 1 and 2, u1 = u4 = 1. But then, u2 = u3 = 0 and (2;3) = 1 imply that (2;3) is a
blocking pair for (jN;ujN); contradicting '(jN) = S(jN).
Theorem 3 together with Theorems 1 and 2 implies the following two impossibility results.
Corollary 1.
(a) There exists no solution ' that is subsolution of the core whenever the core is nonempty and
that satises indierence with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and consistency.
(b) There exists no solution ' that is subsolution of the core whenever the core is nonempty and
that satises Pareto indierence and consistency.
Sasaki (1995) provides the following two characterizations of the core for two-sided assignment
problems (similarly as for Sasaki's, 1995, Theorem 1, we have corrected his Theorem 2 by adding
indierence with respect to dummy agents.8).
Sasaki's (1995), Theorem 2. On the class of two-sided assignment problems, the core is the
unique solution satisfying individual rationality, couple rationality, Pareto optimality, indierence
with respect to dummy agents, continuity, consistency, and weak pairwise-monotonicity.
Sasaki's (1995) Theorem 4. On the class of two-sided assignment problems, the core is the unique
solution satisfying individual rationality, couple rationality, Pareto optimality, Pareto indierence,
consistency, and weak pairwise-monotonicity.
8Recall that solution ~ '   S as dened in Remark 3 satises all properties stated in Sasaki's (1995) Theorem 2.
14On the class of two-sided assignment problems, Sasaki (1995) proves his characterizations of
the core as follows.
Step 1. Sasaki (1995, Propositions 3 and 4) proves that the core satises all properties used in
both characterizations
Step 2. Sasaki (1995, Proof of Theorems 2 and 4) shows that a solution that satises all properties
as stated in each of the characterizations is a subsolution of the core.
Step 3. Finally, using Sasaki (1995, Theorems 1 and 3), the characterizations follow.
Note that with Proposition 1 and Theorems 1 and 2 we have established Sasaki's Steps 1 and 3
for solvable one-sided assignment problems. Observe, however, that in these steps weak pairwise-
monotonicity has not been actively used. A close look at the proofs related to Sasaki's proof Step 2
reveals that this is where weak pairwise-monotonicity is heavily used. Even though the core is
a weakly pairwise-monotonic solution on the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems, the
strength of weak pairwise-monotonicity as a property on that class of assignment problems turns
out to be quite dierent from its strength on the class of two-sided assignment problems. The main
dierence is that in Sasaki's two-sided assignment model any pairwise-monotonic transformation
of a characteristic function (see Denition 8) leads to another two-sided assignment problem and
therefore to solvability by default. However, for solvable one-sided assignment problems, a small
pairwise-monotonic transformation can transform a solvable one-sided assignment problem into a
one-sided assignment problem with an empty core. In other words, for problems on the boundary
of the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems, we are not able to use weak pairwise-
monotonicity in the same way as Sasaki (1995) does because it would lead us outside the class of
solvable one-sided assignment problems. The validity of Sasaki's (1995) characterizations of the
core on the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems is currently an open problem.
We conclude with an illustrative example that shows that for the class of solvable one-sided
assignment problems, increasing the value of a couple (i;j) might change the position of a one-
sided assignment problem within the class of one-sided assignment problems. In particular, the
solvable one-sided assignment problem 0 is one on the boundary of the class of solvable one-sided
assignment problems for which a direct adaptation of Sasaki's proof Step 2 would not work (for
instance, the pairwise-monotonic transformation from 0 to  transforms a solvable one-sided
assignment problem in one with an empty core).
Example 3. Changes of the core when the value of a couple changes.
Let N = f1;2;3g and " 2 (0;1). Consider the following characteristic functions:  such that
(1;2) = 2, (1;3) = 1, (2;3) = 1   ", 0 such that 0(1;2) = 2, 0(1;3) = 1, 0(2;3) = 1, and
 such that (1;2) = 2, (1;3) = 1, (2;3) = 1 + ". Then for the corresponding one-sided
assignment problems  = (N;), 0 = (N;0), and  = (N;), we have S() = f(;u) j  =
(2;1;3) and u = (1 + ;1   ;0) for  2 [0;"]g; S(0) = f(;u) j  = (2;1;3) and u = (1;1;0)g;
and S() = ;. 
15For the solvable one-sided assignment problem  in Example 3 there is a unique optimal match-
ing and an innite number of payo vectors associated with it; so jS()j = 1. Furthermore, these
properties are maintained for small changes of the characteristic function. Without introducing
the formal denitions here, we state that the one-sided assignment problem  is in the interior of
the set of solvable one-sided assignment problems. More generally, one can show that a one-sided
assignment problem is in the interior of the set of solvable one-sided assignment problems whenever
the core exhibits an innite set of payo vectors.
For the solvable one-sided assignment problem 0 in Example 3 there is a unique optimal match-
ing and a unique payo vector; so jS(0)j = 1. Furthermore, small changes of the characteristic
function (e.g., as represented by  or  for small "), completely change the core: either from a
nite set to an innite set (if 0 is changed to ) or from a nite set to an empty set (if 0 is changed
to ). More generally, one can show that a one-sided assignment problem is on the boundary of
the set of solvable one-sided assignment problems whenever the core exhibits a unique payo vector
(and thus, a nite outcome set).
Any one-sided assignment problem that is not solvable, e.g.,  in Example 3, is clearly outside
of the set of solvable one-sided assignment problems.
We conjecture, that if Sasaki's (1995, Theorems 2 and 4) characterizations hold on the class of
solvable one-sided assignment problems, the proof techniques for the interior and the boundary of
the class dier.
A Appendix
We slightly modify the model as introduced in Section 2 by extending the denition of a characteris-
tic function  to allow for variable reservation values, i.e., for any N 2 N a function  : P(N) ! R+
is a characteristic function for N. In particular, we now do not require that for each agent i 2 N,
the reservation value (i;i) is xed to equal 0.
Theorem 4. On the class of solvable one-sided problems with nonnegative reservation values that
are allowed to vary, if ' is a subsolution of the core satisfying continuity and consistency, then '
coincides with the core.
Proof. Let  2  N be a solvable problem. Then, since ' is a subsolution of the core, '()  S().
We prove that '()  S(), i.e., we show that (;u) 2 S() implies (;u) 2 '(). The proof
strategy is similar to Theorem 1.
Step 1: Let (;u) 2 S(). Let n 2 NnN and N = N [fng. We dene  such that for each i 2 N,
(i) = (i) and (n) = n. For each i 2 N, let (i;n) = ui = u
i and for each (i;j) 2 P(N),
(i;j) = (i;j). Let  = (N;). Because the entrant n does not create any new blocking pairs,
it follows that (;u) 2 S().







each i 2 S(), "(i;j) = u"
i = "
2.9 For each (i;j) 2 P(N) n C(), "(i;j) = (i;j). Let
" = (N;"). Because the change in agents' values does not create any new blocking pairs, it
follows that (;u") 2 S(").
Claim 1:  is the unique optimal matching for ", i.e, OM(") = fg.









(i;j)20 (i;j) + jC() \ C(0)j " + jS() \ S(0)j "
2: (8)
Observe that
jC() \ C(0)j  jC()j and jS() \ S(0)j  jS()j: (9)
Since the number of agents jNj at both 0 and  is invariant, if jS() \ S(0)j = jS()j and
jC() \ C(0)j = jC()j, then S(0) = S() and C(0) = C(). Consequently, 0 = , a





(i;j)20 "(i;j). Hence, OM(") = fg.
By Claim 1,  is the unique optimal matching for ".
Claim 2: Let (; ~ u) 2 S("). Then, for each i 2 N, j~ ui   u"
ij  "
2.
For each i 2 S(), ~ ui = u"
i = 0. Hence, j~ ui   u"
ij = 0. Let (i;j) 2 C().
Case 1: ~ ui   u"
i <  "
2
Then ~ ui < u"
i   "
2 = u
i = ui. By construction, for each i 2 N, (i;n) = ui. Thus, (i;n) forms a
blocking pair, and (; ~ u) = 2 S(").
Case 2: ~ ui   u"
i > "
2
Since  2 OM("), for any (i;j) 2 C(), ~ ui + ~ uj = u"
i + u"
j. Then ~ ui   u"
i = u"
j   ~ uj > "
2. Thus,
~ uj   u"
j <  "
2 and similarly as in Case 1, it follows that (; ~ u) = 2 S(").
Step 3: By assumption, '(")  S("). Thus, S(") \ '(") 6= ;, i.e., there exists (;  u) 2
S(")\'("). By Claim 2, for each i 2 N, j ui u"
ij  "








jN) = (;u). By consistency, (
jN;u
jN) 2 '(
jN). Hence, (;u) 2 '().
9Note that we increase the reservation values of single agents at 
 { this is only possible if we change the
assignment model to allow reservation values to vary.
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